Private design study · October 11, 2026

A small float.
A complete balance sheet.

A proposed launch system for 1,000 Stonkies on Robinhood Chain. The model measures tradeoffs; it does not predict adoption or identify a universally optimal token price.

The proposed experience

The prototype now uses a revised 250-token bundle. The original 650-token bundle below remains the documented stress baseline. Mint a donkey, activate it once, then claim over time. No prediction game, daily clicking, recursive staking, or mandatory renewal is needed for this first design. The NFT carries its remaining token entitlement and activation state when transferred. Already claimed tokens cannot be claimed again.

1. Mint. The first NFT costs 0.01 ETH and the last costs 0.03 ETH on a public linear curve. Three scheduled windows release 333, 333 and 334 seats. Unsold seats carry forward; the final sale has a published closing date. The model imposes sales on days 0, 7 and 14; these sales are demand assumptions, not observed willingness to pay.
2. Activate. Burn 100 STONKEY once. The illustrative opening pool quotes about 0.002024 ETH for those tokens, before gas. Users can use tokens they already hold. The model refuses activations costing more than an assumed 0.03 ETH; this is a simulated buyer budget, not a promised contract price cap.
3. Claim. The revised seat has 250 STONKEY; the original comparison baseline has 650. Wait seven complete days after activation, then unlock linearly over 180 more days. There is no cliff catch-up payment. A separate, finite ETH pot funds holder distributions.

For simplicity, the first candidate drops holding-age mint discounts. Early positions already cost less. A discount qualification system can be reconsidered after demand and sybil behavior are understood; it is not silently included in these numbers.

Token supply and ownership

Original stress baseline: 5% pool / 65% NFT escrow / 30% matching reserve. The revised candidate changes this to 5% / 25% / 70%: 50,000 opening pool tokens, 250,000 NFT tokens and 700,000 earmarked matching tokens. Its larger matching reserve stays locked to the published pairing purpose; unused reserve must not become a discretionary team unlock.

Supply is fixed at 1,000,000. This number is a denomination choice, not a scarcity mechanism. At full activation, 100,000 tokens are burned and up to 650,000 leave NFT escrow: a net 550,000-token release relative to those burns. Locks delay circulation; they are not permanent destruction. The 300,000 liquidity reserve is additional circulating inventory when paired.

Unminted NFTs and their token inventory remain unavailable after the sale closes in the proposed launch policy. Any later release would require a separately disclosed change before commitments; it is not included in the model. Pool capital remains protocol-owned and is not creator withdrawal revenue. Final lock/custody mechanics require contract implementation.

Exactly where the 80% goes

The RWA version creates a more interesting asset mix, but does not automatically improve returns. Both variants have the same 20% creator share.

Liquidity takes two assets. At the opening price, the 300,000-token reserve can match only 6 ETH. Actual capacity changes as the price changes. Any excess ETH stays in a separately reported liquidity reserve. It does not silently buy tokens, fund rewards, or count as active pool capital. The model never manufactures matching tokens.

There is no automatic buyback in this candidate. A buyback spends existing capital and can benefit sellers; adding one should be justified by executable-price tests rather than counting its own purchase as new demand. The model includes neither wash trading nor market-making volume supplied by the creator.

A real-world asset hook that fits

The Stable Reserve: a small sleeve of short-duration US Treasury ETF exposure, rather than a portfolio of speculative stock picks. Robinhood's official registry lists an active SGOV token on chain 4663. The proposed sleeve models that acquisition at cost with zero assumed yield and no simulated trades.

Robinhood Stock Tokens provide economic exposure through tokenized debt securities; they are not direct share ownership. Their corporate-action multiplier does not deposit spendable ETH. Any eventual cash distribution requires realized proceeds and accounting for asset prices, ETH/USD movements, trading costs, and eligible acquisition/redemption routes. Executable SGOV liquidity and treasury eligibility remain unverified.

The reserve is protocol-owned in this candidate. It is not an NFT redemption guarantee. A rule for distributing realized net income can be added once an actual instrument and route are verified. The website must not display this reserve as individually claimable backing.

Scale matters: a hypothetical 4% annual return on 4 ETH-equivalent of principal is only 0.16 ETH-equivalent per year, before costs and exchange-rate changes. Across 1,000 seats that is 0.00016 per seat. This illustration is not a quoted SGOV yield. The RWA sleeve supplies a distinct asset exposure; it cannot finance large recurring rewards at this launch size.

Payday, without a jackpot

Use a predictable weekly claim date for distributions accrued while holding an activated Stonky. Each activated seat earns one unit of weight per eligible second. Holding for a whole week therefore earns more than buying just before a payout. No claim-time snapshot, last-second bonus, or endlessly increasing early-holder multiplier is needed.

Seller-accrued rewards remain the seller's; future accrual belongs to the new owner. NFT activation and remaining token vesting do not restart on transfer. A real implementation needs transfer-time accrual checkpoints and exactly-once claims. The current simulator tracks per-seat funded accrual, not wallet-level ownership or transfer-time entitlements.

The 20% mint pot is a finite opening distribution, not yield. The model releases each mint's allocation over the configured vesting duration while seats are active. Collected ETH LP fees can add to that pot; token-denominated fees remain token reserves. A random jackpot changes who receives the same money and adds randomness, timing and concentration risks. It does not improve expected economic value.

Creator revenue from trading

Collected LP fees = gross swap fees
                 × (1 − exchange protocol fee share)
                 × protocol-owned active liquidity share

Creator share = 20% of those collected fees
Holder share  = 80% of those collected fees

The simulation assumes a 1% gross swap fee, a conservative one-sixth exchange cut, and 100% ownership of active liquidity. That produces a creator share of about 0.1667% of gross trading inputs, in the asset paid as fees. At those assumptions, 100 ETH of buy-side volume produces about 0.167 ETH of creator fees. The actual pool fee, exchange cut and ownership must be verified; swaps elsewhere do not automatically pay this project.

Fees from token sales arrive as tokens. Their spot-marked value is not realized ETH revenue. The model segregates them instead of selling them invisibly. Gas, deployment, artwork, audits, operations and taxes are not deducted from the revenue figures.

Original 650-token baseline: 240 days

All full-sale rows assume the entire NFT collection sells. Outside token buying is additional to mint spending and activation purchases. Scenario names describe imposed flows; they are not probability estimates. Token sale rates and outside-holder selling differ by scenario, so this table is not a controlled one-variable experiment.

"No outside buyers" assumes half of released tokens are sold. "Every unlock sold" assumes all are sold. Modest flow assumes 0.025 ETH of gross outside buys per day and 0.8% daily selling of outside-held token inventory. Strong flow assumes 0.1 ETH/day, 0.5% outside inventory selling, and 35% of unlocked tokens sold. Minting and activation demand still exist in the no-outside-buyer scenarios.

Retained tokens can fund subsequent activations, so one token burn does not equal one new purchase. A token claim has no guaranteed ETH value. Spot price is a marginal quote; selling the whole supply at that price is impossible. No table value represents an NFT resale forecast or a participant's net profit.

Reducing the token bundle

The additional 48 allocation cases compare 250, 400 and 650-token bundles with 50, 100, 200 and 300-token burns and both treasury splits. The following controlled comparison holds activation at 100, assumes a full sale, 1 ETH seed, 5% opening pool and no outside buying. Every token has fully vested by the end.

The 250 / 100 candidate is a better starting point for further testing. It preserves affordable activation in these paths and reduces the post-vesting sell burden. However, smaller NFT bundles can improve the token chart while making the NFT less valuable to a buyer. Holder cash net is sales plus ETH distributions minus mint and activation spending, before remaining token/NFT value and costs; it is not total investment return.

The revised 250-token NFT releases at most 250,000 tokens against 100,000 activation burns: net +150,000 tokens from that channel. It still is not deflationary overall. In the half-sold/no-outside/60%-LP path, about 292,403 matching tokens remain unused. Their disposition must remain constrained and visible.

For comparison, the original 650-token baseline needs approximately 8.54 ETH of gross outside buying, offset by 3.73 ETH of outside sales, over 240 days to finish at its opening spot price under the specified 50%-claim-sale and 0.8%-daily-outside-inventory-sale assumptions. This calculated threshold is not a prediction or holder break-even point.

Original baseline with the RWA sleeve

The RWA NAV column is a bookkeeping assumption, not a verified mark or return. The sleeve takes capital away from the token pool. A higher token price in one scenario can coexist with less exit liquidity; it is not evidence that the RWA earned that increase.

How thin is too thin?

A single activation is the easy constraint. With 1 ETH and 50,000 tokens, buying 100 tokens costs roughly 1.21% above the pre-trade spot value including a 1% fee. Selling tokens worth 0.1 ETH at that same pre-trade spot returns roughly 9.92% less than that mark and moves the final spot price down roughly 17.2%.

For the same constant-product approximation and fee, about 2.35 ETH of depth is needed for a 0.1 ETH pre-trade-value exit to stay within a 5% average discount. This is a chosen usability target, not a launch requirement. A 1 ETH seed is a deliberate, more volatile experiment. An even thinner seed should be judged against expected exits and launch batches, not merely the cheapest individual activation.

The report compares 2%, 5% and 10% opening token float at both a fixed 1 ETH seed and a fixed opening token price. Those are different experiments: removing pool tokens without removing ETH raises the opening valuation. It does not create more capital.

Incentive constraints before launch

• Late mint demand: later buyers pay three times as much ETH for the same token entitlement. Future demand needs to justify that price independently of the mint curve.
• Finite consumption: one-time activations stop after all 1,000 NFTs activate. This design has no ongoing token burn after that point. A renewal fee without new value would only charge holders to collect distributions.
• Partial sales: the pot and liquidity depend on actual receipts. There is no sellout requirement to start claims. Unissued supply and unspent allocations remain visible.
• Transfers and sybils: rights attach to NFT IDs, not wallets. Moving a Stonky cannot restart its allocation, claim clock or activation. Wallet limits are not identity limits.
• Interleaving: the simulation mints each entire wave before activating it. Real users can interleave minting, buying, claiming and selling; launch execution must be tested under adversarial ordering.
• Unfunded expansion: market capitalization is not treasury cash. Never pay distributions from a quoted token value or an expected future mint.

Scope and evidence

Deterministic decimal-number research model, not contract settlement code. The engine audits token and ETH conservation, capped claims, partial minting, failed activation and reserve exhaustion. It uses a full-range constant-product approximation. Exact Uniswap v3 ticks, gas, MEV, third-party liquidity, provider outages, reorgs and adversarial traders are not simulated. Production funds must use integer atomic units and tested contract/accounting paths.

Recommendation: take the revised 250-token / 100-token-burn candidate into further buyer-economics and execution tests; use the simple Mint → Activate → Claim interaction and compare the 20/40/20/20 RWA split with the 20/60/20 ETH-only split. Treat 5% opening float and a 1 ETH seed as a test case. Do not label the tested 650/100 release-consumption balance optimal: 0 of 36 baseline candidates met the full-cycle stress target. Tightening emission volume or activation cost requires separate tests of whether users can still enter affordably.

Download all scenario inputs, outputs and sensitivity runs · Read the model source · Artwork prompt and provenance

Primary references

• Robinhood Chain network details — mainnet 4663, ETH gas.
• Robinhood Stock Tokens — asset structure, transfer mechanics, corporate actions and access conditions.
• Robinhood asset registry — SGOV candidate listed; trading depth is not established by a registry listing.
• Uniswap v3 Robinhood deployment reference — integration candidate; not local bytecode/provider acceptance.
• Uniswap fee mechanics — gross fees, LP proceeds and protocol fee distinctions.